BEYOND CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: WHY PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT ALONE CANNOT RESOLVE ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN KENYA
Keywords:
constitutional design, presidentialism, parliamentary government, electoral violence, winner-take-all politics, political settlements, Kenya, constitutional conventionsSynopsis
This book examines whether adopting a parliamentary system of government would resolve Kenya's recurrent electoral conflicts. Through a critical realist framework combining historical institutionalism, constitutional design theory, and comparative analysis, the study traces Kenya's constitutional evolution from independence to 2026. It argues that winner-take-all electoral competition is not a single condition but a compound of four mechanisms: executive indivisibility, executive concentration, the absence of a credible institutional position for electoral losers, and the material stakes of exclusion. A parliamentary system would address the first and third mechanisms but leaves the second and fourth largely untouched. The comparative analysis of eight jurisdictions—the United Kingdom, Germany, South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, India, Ethiopia, and Senegal—reveals that parliamentary form is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic stability; Ethiopia demonstrates parliamentary government compatible with catastrophic conflict, while Ghana shows presidentialism compatible with peaceful alternation. The book develops the constitutional displacement thesis: where an informal convention of elite accommodation already performs the integrative function that formal redesign is proposed to perform, constitutional reform systematically displaces the political reform on which its effectiveness depends. The central practical finding is that the primary benefit of parliamentary government—institutionalizing a position for electoral losers—can be secured without changing the executive form, through a constitutionally entrenched Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition. The reform framework recommends sequenced measures addressing electoral administration, party institutionalization, accountability for political violence, fiscal devolution, and only finally, executive redesign—in that order of priority.
References
Afrobarometer. (2021). Round 8 survey data for Kenya. Afrobarometer Data.
Afrobarometer. (2025). Round 9 survey data for Kenya. Afrobarometer Data.
Anderson, D., & Lochery, E. (2008). Violence and exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and preventable? Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2(2), 328–343.
Bagehot, W. (2001). The English constitution (P. Smith, Ed.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1867)
Barkan, J. D. (1993). Kenya: Lessons from a flawed election. Journal of Democracy, 4(3), 85–99.
Bates, R. H. (1981). Markets and states in tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policies. University of California Press.
Baturo, A., & Elgie, R. (Eds.). (2019). The politics of presidential term limits. Oxford University Press.
Bayart, J.-F. (1993). The state in Africa: The politics of the belly. Longman.
Bayley, D. H. (2006). Changing the guard: Developing democratic police abroad. Oxford University Press.
Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines. University of Michigan Press.
Berman, B. J. (1998). Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: The politics of uncivil nationalism. African Affairs, 97(388), 305–341.
Berman, B. J., & Lonsdale, J. (1992). Unhappy valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. James Currey.
Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science (2nd ed.). Harvester Press.
Bhatia, G. (2025). The hydra and the sword: Constitutional amendments, political process, and the BBI case in Kenya. Global Constitutionalism, 14(2), 349–370.
Bogaards, M. (2000). The uneasy relationship between empirical and normative types in consociational theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(4), 395–423.
Branch, D. (2011). Kenya: Between hope and despair, 1963–2011. Yale University Press.
Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2009). Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. African Affairs, 108(430), 1–26.
Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Central Bank of Kenya. (2026). Diaspora remittances [Data set]. https://www.centralbank.go.ke/diaspora-remittances/
Chabal, P., & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). Africa works: Disorder as political instrument. James Currey.
Chaisty, P., Cheeseman, N., & Power, T. J. (2018). Coalitional presidentialism in comparative perspective: Minority presidents in multiparty systems. Oxford University Press.
Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform. Cambridge University Press.
Cheeseman, N., Kanyinga, K., Lynch, G., Ruteere, M., & Willis, J. (2019). Kenya's 2017 elections: Winner-takes-all politics as usual? Journal of Eastern African Studies, 13(2), 215–234.
Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G., & Willis, J. (2016). Decentralisation in Kenya: The governance of governors. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(1), 1–35.
Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G., & Willis, J. (2020). The moral economy of elections in Africa: Democracy, voting and virtue. Cambridge University Press.
Cheeseman, N., & Tendi, B.-M. (2010). Power-sharing in comparative perspective: The dynamics of 'unity government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 48(2), 203–229.
Downloads
Published
August 30, 2026
Copyright (c) 2026 academicpubs Book Press
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Details about this monograph
ISBN-13 (15)
9798170608027
How to Cite
Abdiweli, M. H., Akoth, S. O., & Nyanchoga, S. A. (Eds.). (2026). BEYOND CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: WHY PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT ALONE CANNOT RESOLVE ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN KENYA. Academicpubs Book Press. https://books.academicpubs.org/index.php/ABP/catalog/book/1
